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INFORMATION DUTIES
1 INTRODUCTION
Information duties – duties to gather or to provide information – represent
the connecting link between knowledge and responsibility in the law of obliga-
tions (section 1.1). This study aims at a comparison of (pre)contractual and
noncontractual information duties. Its goal is to assess how courts nowadays
connect civil responsibility to human knowledge (section 1.2). Chapter 2
contains a general introduction of the subject. Chapters 3 and 4 present a
systematic analysis of information duties in contract law and noncontractual
liability law. Chapter 5 draws conclusions from a general perspective about
the role of information duties in the law of obligations.
2 EXPLORATION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER
Information duties have been known for ages, but it is only since the second
half of the twentieth century that they seem to be considered as a separate
legal issue within the law of obligations (section 2.1.1). Information duties do
not have a single statutory basis in Dutch law (section 2.2.1). As far as they
are based upon unwritten law, e.g. upon reasonableness and fairness, good
faith, common opinion or generally accepted standards, their contents should
be uniform (section 2.2.4).
Twomain types of information duties are the duty to investigate on the one
hand, obliging the responsible party to gather information in his own interest,
and the duty of disclosure or the duty to warn on the other hand, obliging the
responsible party to provide information in the interest of the other party
(section 2.3.1). For the sake of clarity and coherence, it is important to equalize
duties of disclosure and duties to warn as far as possible (section 2.3.2).
Information duties aim to promotewell-informed behaviour. They ensure
that people can take future decisions on the basis of adequate information
(section 2.3.3). Information duties have a derivative character, since they
originate from a (pre)contractual or noncontractual relationship between the
parties involved. They can be qualified as ‘Obliegenheiten’ (section 2.4.1). For
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practical reasons, compliance with information duties cannot be enforced in
advance (section 2.4.2).
Comparative legal research shows that during the twentieth century, the
importance of information duties – especially precontractual duties of dis-
closure – has grown throughout Europe (section 2.5.1). French, German and
English law offer three representative perspectives. In England, the courts have
so far stuck to the principle that individuals have their own responsibility with
regard to the gathering of information, and, consequently, that there is no
general duty of disclosure (section 2.8.1 et seq.). In France, on the other hand,
the courts try to create a high level of (consumer) protection through ‘cat-
egorial’ constructions, often aimed at the relationship between businesses and
consumers (section 2.6.1 et seq.). German law, like Dutch law, chooses the
middle of the road (section 2.7.1 et seq.). In European private law, information
duties play an important role as well (section 2.9.1 et seq.). However, there
seems to be no general European consensus on the subject matter of this study
(section 2.9.5).
3 INFORMATION DUTIES IN CONTRACT LAW
Contract law is dominated by the idea that people choosing to negotiate a
contract have to communicatewith each other in an adequatemanner (section
3.1.1). With regard to this communication, individual autonomy serves as the
guiding principle (section 3.1.2).
Formation of contracts
Within the scope of the formation of contracts, information duties first of all
play a role in determining the intention of the parties under articles 3:33-3:35
of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC). Article 3:35 in connection with article 3:11 DCC
refers to a duty to investigate the intention of a party entering into a contract.
This duty depends in particular on the foreseeability of prejudice from the
perspective of the responsible party (section 3.2.1). Article 3:35 DCC can also
give rise to other mutual information duties (section 3.2.2). These are defined
by the reasonable expectations of the parties involved, as the relevant case
law illustrates (section 3.3.1 et seq.).
Information duties also play a role in questions of unauthorized representa-
tion (section 3.4.1 et seq.). Article 3:61 paragraph 2 DCC, which protects a party
who reasonably believed an agent to be authorized, refers to mutual informa-
tion duties of the principal and the other party (section 3.4.2). These are defined
by the reasonable expectations of the parties involved, depending on (inter
alia) the appointment of the agent, the usualness of his representative act and
the recognizability of the (lacking) authorization (section 3.4.3). The statutory
requirement of causation by the principal (‘toedoen’), as codified in article
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3:61 paragraph 2 DCC, remains the guiding principle in cases of unauthorized
representation (section 3.4.5).
Grounds of invalidity (vitiated consent)
The validity of contracts is influenced by information duties as well, especially
in cases of vitiated consent. Article 3:44 paragraph 4 DCC, concerning undue
influence, refers to a duty to investigate the intention of a party entering into
a contract as a result of special circumstances. This duty depends in particular
on the foreseeability of prejudice from the perspective of the responsible party.
Moreover, article 3:44 paragraph 5 DCC can give rise to a duty to investigate
the possibility of vitiated consent caused by a third party (section 3.5.1). Article
3:44 paragraph 3 DCC, concerning fraud, also provides a statutory basis for
mutual information duties (section 3.5.3).
The most important foundation of precontractual information duties is
article 6:228 DCC, concerning error. During the twentieth century, Dutch case
law gradually abandoned the idea of error as a sole question of vitiated
consent, and increasingly paid attention to the defendant’s conduct as the cause
of the error. This resulted in a two-sided approach, based on the reasonable
expectations of the parties involved (section 3.5.4).
Article 6:228 paragraph 1b DCC stipulates that a contract may be nullified
if the defendant should have informed the party in error. Thus, the article
refers to a precontractual duty of disclosure (‘mededelingsplicht’). This duty
can be assumed if the defendant at the time of the conclusion of the contract
knew or could reasonably be expected to know (i) the facts about which the
other party was in error, (ii) the causal link between this error and the con-
clusion of the contract – i.e. the importance of the relevant information – and
(iii) the possibility of an error (section 3.6.1). The knowledge of the responsible
party, which is at stake when applying these three basic requirements, should
only be objectified in a limited sense (section 3.6.2). The assumption of a duty
to investigate as a consequence of the duty of disclosure (an ‘obligation de
s’informer pour informer’) is undesirable (section 3.6.4).
Apart from these three basic requirements, the assumption of a precontrac-
tual duty of disclosure under article 6:228 paragraph 1b DCC depends on a
comprehensive, contextual assessment of commonopinion (‘verkeersopvattin-
gen’). The individual circumstances are decisive, as the relevant case law
illustrates (section 3.7.1 et seq.). In particular, three factors are important when
answering the question whether the responsible party, according to common
opinion, is obliged to share his knowledge with the other party. These factors
are: the nature of the legal relationship between the parties, the nature of the
information to be disclosed and the nature of the interests involved (section 3.6.3).
Compliance with a duty of disclosure under article 6:228 paragraph 1b
DCC implies, according to the Dutch Supreme Court decision in the case
Gomes/Rental, that the information provided must be sufficiently clear. This
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means that the information should be provided in such a way, that the party
in error can be expected (i) to notice the information (formal clarity) and (ii)
to understand the information and act accordingly (substantive clarity). The
duty of disclosure therefore has a wide scope, but it does not intend to guar-
antee well-informed behaviour (section 3.6.5).
Article 6:228 paragraph 1a DCC stipulates that a contract may be nullified
if the error is due to information given by the other party. Thus, the article
refers to a duty of truthfulness (‘waarheidsplicht’), which obliges the defendant
to inform the mistaken party correctly about relevant matters. However, not
each form of incorrect information can cause the contract to be nullified. The
mistaken party for his part has a duty to investigate, which obliges him – to
a certain extent – to verify the information provided (section 3.6.6).
Article 6:228 paragraph 1c DCC, concerning mutual error, stipulates that
a contract may be nullified if both parties made the same incorrect assumption
in entering into the contract. Thus, the article provides a basis for mutual
information duties. In particular, it refers to a possible duty to investigate on
the part of the defendant. Yet such a duty can only be accepted under ex-
ceptional circumstances (section 3.6.9). The outcome will depend on a con-
textual assessment of common opinion, in the light of the three factors men-
tioned in section 3.6.3.
The duty of disclosure, the duty of truthfulness and the duty to investigate
are complemented by their counterpart, the duty to investigate of the party in
error. This duty is expressed in article 6:228 paragraph 2 DCC, which stipulates
that the nullification of a contract cannot be based on a mistake which should
remain for the account of the party in error, in the light of common opinion.
Whether the mistaken party has a duty to investigate, depends on the scope
of the defendant’s information duty, and vice versa (section 3.6.11).
Thus, the mutual information duties in cases of error should be qualified
as complementary duties, i.e. as mutual counterparts (section 3.6.13). This
‘digital’ approach is preferable to the ‘analogous’ approach chosen by the
majority of Dutch authors, according to which the mutual information duties
in cases of error function as independent factors, overlapping each other
mutually (section 3.6.14).
According to the case law of the Dutch Supreme Court, the relationship
between the mutual information duties in cases of error is determined by two
priority rules. First, the mistaken party may generally rely on the correctness
of the information provided by the other party, i.e. the duty of truthfulness
usually prevails over the duty to investigate of the mistaken party (section
3.6.15). The same goes for the duty of disclosure, which – according to the
case law of the Dutch Supreme Court – aims at the protection of careless
contracting parties and therefore usually prevails over the duty to investigate
of the mistaken party (section 3.6.16). These two priority rules do not qualify
as actual legal rules. They are only meant as general instructions to the courts
deciding questions of fact (section 3.6.17). Insofar as the Dutch Supreme Court,
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by applying these rules, means to force such courts to argue their decisions
even more amply, if they choose to let the duty to investigate of the mistaken
party prevail, this approach is undesirable. The priority rules are only intended
to regulate the judicial debate, which means that a party who is accused of
breaching an information duty cannot defend himself solely by referring to
the duty to investigate of the party in error (section 3.6.18).
Interpretation, contents and effects of contracts
Apart from the formation and the validity of contracts, the legal effects of
contracts can be affected by precontractual information duties as well. First,
the interpretation of a contract may be influenced by duties to investigate the
meaning of a certain contractual clause, in particular if the other party had
reasons to doubt the supposed meaning (section 3.8.2). On the other hand,
a party who stipulated an unclear clause, can also have a duty of disclosure
about the intended meaning, in particular if he is a professional contracting
with a consumer (section 3.8.3).
Article 6:248 paragraph 1 DCC stipulates that a contract not only has the
legal effects agreed to by the parties, but also those which apply by virtue
of the requirements of reasonableness and fairness. Moreover, paragraph 2
stipulates that a contractual clause does not apply insofar as this would be
unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness. The added
value of reasonableness and fairness in this context – after the interpretation
of the contract, which is influenced by reasonableness and fairness as well –
is that they create the possibility to take into account circumstances that
occurred after the conclusion of the contract (section 3.8.6). Expanding or
restricting the legal effects of contracts bymeans of information duties should
not affect the core of the contractual relationship (sections 3.8.7, 3.8.8).
Performance and nonperformance (remedies)
The performance of contracts, especially the extinctive effect of payments, as
governed by article 6:34 DCC, can be affected by information duties as well.
Normally, the debtor does not need to make thorough inquiries into the
authorization of the recipient of the payment. However, if the debtor has
reasons to doubt the authorization, he is – against the background of article
3:11 DCC, concerning good faith – charged with a duty to investigate (section
3.9.2). Depending on the circumstances of the case, article 6:34 DCC can give
rise to mutual information duties of the debtor and the creditor.
The nonperformance of contracts can be affected by information duties in
two different ways. Information duties that are part of the actual contents of
the contract, i.e. that qualify as contractual obligations, can constitute a breach
of contract directly. Precontractual information duties, however, can contribute
to a breach of contract indirectly (section 3.10.1).
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The view of the majority of Dutch legal authors, that precontractual in-
formation dutiesmust be treated equally in cases of error and nonperformance
(section 3.10.2), deserves support. Nevertheless, the effect of information duties
in cases of error and nonperformance may vary, depending on the circum-
stances. Informational failures as meant in article 6:228 paragraph 1 DCC can
cause the contract to be nullified, but do not automatically lead to a breach
of contract, while the absence of such failures does not necessarily imply
correct performance of the contract (section 3.10.3).
Liability for breach of precontractual information duties (section 3.10.5 et
seq.) is generally based on article 6:162 DCC, concerning unlawful act. The
violation of a precontractual duty of disclosure (article 6:228 paragraph 1b
DCC) or duty to investigate (article 6:228 paragraph 1c DCC) automatically
qualifies as an attributable unlawful act. Violation of a precontractual duty
of truthfulness (article 6:228 paragraph 1a DCC) creates an evidential presump-
tion of unlawfulness. Since precontractual information duties aim to promote
informed consent (section 2.3.3), violation of these duties can only lead to
damages relating to the fact that the mistaken party has negotiated a contract
based on incorrect or incomplete information. Liability therefore does not
concern the so-called ‘positive contractual interest’, i.e. the profits themistaken
party, based on his erroneous assumption, hoped to make (section 3.10.6). It
is not advisable to base liability for breach of precontractual information duties
on article 6:74 DCC, concerning breach of contract, unless the contractual
terminology appears perfectly natural under the given circumstances. Anyhow,
the choice of article 6:74 or 6:162 DCC as a basis for liability should have no
substantive consequences (section 3.10.7).
The attribution of a breach of contract under articles 6:74 and 6:75 DCC can
be affected by information duties as well. Article 6:75 DCC, concerning force
majeure, provides a basis for mutual information duties of the debtor and the
creditor. According to common opinion (‘verkeersopvattingen’), asmentioned
by the article, the debtor who wishes to remain protected from the legal
consequences of a foreseeable impediment of performance, should investigate
this impediment and inform the creditor about it (section 3.10.9).
Books 7 and 7a of the Dutch Civil Code, governing specific contracts, refer
to various information duties. Some of them qualify as contractual obligations,
while others can be classified as precontractual or post-contractual information
duties (section 3.11.1). The requirement of conformity in the field of the sale
of goods, as codified in article 7:17 DCC, refers to the reasonable expectations
of the buyer. Thus, the requirement of conformity provides a basis for a
precontractual duty to investigate the properties of the purchased goods on
the part of the buyer. This duty (inter alia) depends on the information pro-
vided or concealed by the seller. Therefore, the precontractual information
duties within the scope of error also affect the requirement of conformity. In
both legal doctrines, the information duties should be treated equally (section
3.11.8).
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Termination of negotiations
Precontractual liability for the termination of contractual negotiations is in-
fluenced by information duties as well. According to the Dutch Supreme Court
decision in the case CBB/JPO, breaking off negotiations may, depending on the
circumstances, be unacceptable because of the reasonable expectations of the
other party regarding the conclusion of the contract (section 3.12.1). The
resulting precontractual liability –which should be based on article 6:162 DCC,
governing unlawful acts (section 3.12.2) – may in some cases be related to the
violation of an information duty by the party breaking off the negotiations.
Legal doctrine assumes that it is negligent to carry on negotiations while
knowing that the other party makes no real chance (anymore) to win the
contract, resulting in unnecessary costs made by the other party. Such a duty
of disclosure relating to foreseeable impediments does not apply as a general
rule. In particular, the nature of the interests involved and the nature of the legal
relationship between the parties are relevant in this respect (section 3.12.3).
4 INFORMATION DUTIES IN LIABILITY LAW
Whereas the conclusion of a contract involves an inherent risk of disappoint-
ment, everyday life in society is not without risks either. Members of society
can be expected to protect themselves and others to a certain extent against
those risks (section 4.1.1). Like in contract law, individual autonomy serves
as the guiding principle (section 4.1.2).
Liability arising from unlawful acts
Article 6:162 paragraph 1 DCC stipulates that a person who commits an
unlawful act against another which is attributable to him, must repair the
resulting damage. The article serves as an important basis for noncontractual
information duties (section 4.2.1). More specifically, the requirements of
unlawfulness, attributability and relativity (breach of a duty serving to protect
the victim against the damage suffered) can give rise to noncontractual in-
formation duties (section 4.2.3). The requirement of unlawfulness, as codified
in article 6:162 paragraph 2 DCC, is not always influenced by the ‘informational
context’ of the harmful conduct. The first two categories of unlawfulness,
infringement of a right (section 4.2.4 et seq.) and breach of a statutory duty
(section 4.2.9), refer to ‘objective’ standards of unlawfulness. The attributable
breach of these standards automatically creates liability, regardless of the
knowledge of the injuring party and regardless of his possible warnings of
the victim.
The third category of unlawfulness, negligence, i.e. breach of a rule of
unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct, serves as the most important
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basis for noncontractual information duties. The duties of care which are at
stake here, have a contextual nature. The unwritten law of proper social
conduct demands that people not expose others to a greater risk than is
reasonably justified under the given circumstances. In more specific terms,
the outcome depends on the reasonable expectations on both sides (section 4.2.10).
In applying this standard, the knowledge of the wrongdoer plays a crucial
role. Negligence depends on the foreseeability of damage (section 4.2.11 et
seq.).
Apart from the requirement of unlawfulness, noncontractual information
duties can also play a role in the attribution of unlawful conduct under article
6:162 paragraph 3 DCC. In particular, the article can charge thewrongdoer with
a duty to investigate or the victim with a duty to warn. The added value of these
information duties is especially evident in the field of infringement of a right
and breach of a statutory duty, the two ‘objective’ categories of unlawfulness
(section 4.2.16).
Information duties under article 6:162 DCC
Although the noncontractual duty to warn (‘waarschuwingsplicht’) originally
used to be applied in a negative sense, as an unlawful conduct defence, now-
adays it tends to be based directly on article 6:162 paragraph 2 DCC, as an
independent duty of care. This means that in case of injury resulting from
dangerous activities, the victim has to prove that the wrongdoer behaved
negligently, whereas the wrongdoer has to prove that he warned the victim
or that a warning would not have prevented the injury (section 4.3.1).
When applying the noncontractual duty to warn, the contractual doctrine
of error can serve as a useful point of reference. The basic requirements for
a precontractual duty of disclosure under article 6:228 paragraph 1b DCC can
be ‘translated’ into noncontractual terms (section 4.3.2). Thus, a duty to warn
can be assumed if the wrongdoer knew or ought to know about (i) the danger
he needed to warn for, (ii) the potential damage as a result of it and (iii) the
possibility of inadvertence on the part of the victim.
These three basic requirements refer to the foreseeability of damage, as
discussed in section 4.2.11. Like in the doctrine of error (section 3.6.2), the
knowledge of the responsible party, which is at stakewhen applying the three
basic requirements, should only be objectified in a limited sense. The assump-
tion of a duty to investigate as a consequence of the duty to warn is undesir-
able (section 4.3.3).
Apart from the three basic requirements, the assumption of a noncon-
tractual duty to warn under article 6:162 DCC depends on a comprehensive,
contextual assessment of generally accepted standards (section 4.3.2). The
individual circumstances are decisive, as the relevant case law illustrates
(section 4.4.1 et seq.). In particular, three factors are important when answering
the question whether the wrongdoer, according to generally accepted
Summary 597
standards, is obliged to warn potential victims. These factors are, like in the
doctrine of error (section 3.6.3): the nature of the legal relationship between the
parties, the nature of the information to warn for and the nature of the interests
involved (section 4.3.4). The third factor is elaborated in thewell-known ‘Kelder-
luikfactoren’, the Dutch equivalent of the Learned Hand-formula (section 4.3.5
et seq.).
Compliancewith a duty towarn under article 6:162 DCC implies, according
to the Dutch Supreme Court decision in the Jetblast case, that the warning
should be framed in such a way that it can be expected to prevent the danger
from materialising. In other words, the likely effectiveness of the warning is
decisive. This standard does not imply, as is sometimes suggested in legal
doctrine, that a warning should always have effective power, regardless of
the individual circumstances (section 4.3.7).
Apart from the noncontractual duty to warn, generally accepted standards
can also give rise to a duty to investigate on the part of the wrongdoer. Like
the duty to warn, this duty depends on the foreseeability of damage. More
specifically, a noncontractual duty to investigate can only be assumed if the
wrongdoer knew or ought to know about the possibility of damage as a result
of the materialisation of danger (section 4.3.9). Apart from this basic require-
ment, a contextual assessment of generally accepted standards is needed
(section 4.3.10).
In noncontractual liability law, the victim also has his own responsibility
in respect of the gathering of information. No duty to warn exists, if the
wrongdoer could reasonably expect the victim to know the risks involved and
to behave accordingly. Consequently, the victim may – depending on the
circumstances – be chargedwith a duty to investigate foreseeable dangers. This
duty serves as the logical counterpart of the duty to warn (section 4.3.12). As
a result, the wrongdoer does not need to warn the victim for generally known
risks, i.e. risks that are so obvious, that all members of societymay be expected
to know them (section 4.3.13).
Against this background, themutual information duties under article 6:162
DCC – i.e. the wrongdoer’s duty towarn on the one hand and the victim’s duty
to investigate on the other hand – should be qualified as complementary duties,
in the sense that the duty of the wrongdoer ends where the duty of the victim
begins, and vice versa. In the case Eurosportief/Wesselink, the Dutch Supreme
Court suggested that there is a potential overlap between the wrongdoer’s
duty to warn and the victim’s duty to investigate, similar to the overlap
between the duty of disclosure and the duty to investigate in the doctrine of
error. Given the dangers of ‘commonsense warnings’ this approach is undesir-
able (section 4.3.15). Also in the field of contributory negligence (article 6:101
DCC) a ‘digital’ approach to the mutual information duties is to be preferred.
In other words, the failure of a victim to investigate risks of which the wrong-
doer should have warned him, does not qualify as contributory negligence
(section 4.3.16).
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Strict liability
The strict liabilities of chapter 6.3.2 DCC can be considered as logical corollaries
of the unwritten safety standards from the doctrine of negligence. However,
since they are strict liabilities, they do not require unlawfulness and attribution
in the same way as article 6:162 DCC does. The ‘informational context’ of the
harmful conduct – i.e. the foreseeability of damage and the need to warn
potential victims, in the light of their own responsibility – is less relevant in
this context. Nevertheless, the strict liabilities of chapter 6.3.2 DCC are still
significantly affected by the fault principle (section 4.5.1).
Accordingly, the strict liabilities for dangerous things – defectivemovables
(article 6:173 DCC), defective immovables (articles 6:174 DCC) and defective
products (article 6:185) – are subjected to a requirement of foreseeability. This
means that no strict liability exists, if the possibility of damagewas objectively
unknown until the realization of the danger (section 4.5.5). Moreover, the
importance of the informational context is demonstrated by the fact that articles
6:173, 6:174 and 6:185 DCC can give rise to information duties on the part of the
possessor of the (im)movable or the producer of the product (sections 4.5.2,
4.5.3 and 4.5.7). These information duties follow from the statutory requirement
of defectiveness (‘gebrekkigheid’). On the other hand, the victim also has his
own responsibility, in the sense that he has to anticipate generally known risks.
The strict liabilities therefore do not qualify as guarantee standards (section
4.5.9).
For all that, the informational context does not play the same role in the
field of strict liabilities as in the field of negligence. The contextual safety
assessment, prescribed by the statutory criterion of defectiveness, does not
refer to the conduct of the defendant, but to the safety of the (im)movable or
product involved. The added value of this ‘objective’ approach is especially
evident in cases of hidden safety defects (sections 4.5.5, 4.5.9).
Employer’s liability
Article 7:658 paragraph 1 DCC, concerning employer’s liability, stipulates that
an employer is obliged to take all reasonablemeasures to prevent the employee
from suffering damage in the course of his work. Paragraph 2 adds that a
breach of this duty makes the employer liable. Thus, the emphasis is on the
employer’s duty of care instead of on the employee’s own responsibility
(section 4.6.1). The article can give rise to a duty to investigate the safety of the
working environment on the part of the employer (section 4.6.2). Furthermore,
the employer has to take into account a considerable degree of carelessness
on the part of his employees. Accordingly, the Dutch Supreme Court has ruled
in relation to article 7:658 paragraph 1 DCC that physical safety measures are to
be preferred to warnings. If the employer, however, warns his employees
instead of taking other measures, he must ensure that his instructions are
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respected by the employees (section 4.6.3). All the same, according to estab-
lished case law article 7:658 DCC does not qualify as a guarantee standard for
the safety of the working environment. The employee, too, has a responsibility,
especially in relation to generally known risks, with which he is familiar
outside the working environment also (section 4.6.3).
Unfair commercial practices and misleading advertising
Section 6.3.3A DCC, concerning unfair commercial practices, and Section 6.3.4
DCC, concerning misleading and comparative advertising, aim to prevent
traders from providing incorrect or incomplete information to the public
(section 4.7.1). Article 6:193b paragraph 3 DCC refers to misleading commercial
practice as a form of unfair commercial practice. Not only the supply of in-
correct information (article 6:193c paragraph 1 DCC), but also the supply of
incomplete information (article 6:193d paragraph 1 DCC) qualifies as a mis-
leading commercial practice. Amisleading omission exists, according to article
6:193d paragraph 2 DCC, in case of the concealment of ‘essential’ information
(section 4.7.2).
Article 6:194 DCC stipulates that a trader who publishes misleading infor-
mation regarding goods or services offered by him, acts unlawfully against
his competitors. Themisleading nature of advertising can result not only from
incorrectness, but also from incompleteness (section 4.7.2).
The unfair or misleading nature of commercial communication must be
assessed in the light of the presumed expectations of the ‘average consumer’.
This standard, derived from the well-known Gut Springenheide case of the
European Court of Justice, is relatively strict. Consumers have a duty to invest-
igate, meaning that they may not superficially and uncritically accept what
is presented to them by traders. Compared to the doctrine of error, the assess-
ment of an unfair or misleading nature is more abstract, because unfair com-
mercial practices – like misleading and comparative advertising – usually
involve mass communication (section 4.7.3).
Liability of service providers (professional liability)
The liability of professionals and (other) service providers can be both of a
(pre)contractual and of a noncontractual nature. According to established case
law, professional service providers have a duty of care, meaning that theymust
behave in accordance with the diligence that may be expected from a reason-
ably competent and reasonably acting colleague (section 4.8.1). This duty of
care can, depending on the circumstances, give rise to information duties
(section 4.8.2).
A special duty of care is to be observed, as follows from established case
law, by financial service providers, such as banks and investment managers.
This special duty of care aims to prevent financial consumers from running
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disproportionate financial risks. In the field of options trading and share
leasing, the Dutch Supreme Court has indicated that the special duty of care
of financial service providers aims to protect clients against their own rashness
or lack of competence (section 4.8.3). Providers of options trading are even
chargedwith a statutory duty to refuse if the client violates his so-calledmargin
requirement (section 4.8.4).
In the field of share leasing, the Dutch Supreme Court has indicated that
the special duty of care of financial service providers results in a duty to warn
clients of the risk of a residual debt as inherent in share leasing, a duty to
investigate the financial position of the clients and to advise them on that point.
The said duty to warn has, according to the Dutch Supreme Court, a wider
scope than the general duty of disclosure under article 6:228 paragraph 1b
DCC, in the field of error. There seems to be no convincing foundation of this
two-track approach (section 4.8.5). The special duty of care of financial service
providers should be applied on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the
whole context of the legal relationship between the financial service provider
and his client. In particular, the fact that share investors characteristically
pursue gains deserves more attention as a factor for the interpretation of the
special duty of care of financial service providers (section 4.8.6).
5 COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS
From an overall perspective, three general issues concerning (pre-)contractual
and noncontractual information duties deserve particular attention: human
knowledge as the basis of legal responsibility (section 5.2), the role of informa-
tion duties in the law of obligations and the way they are applied by the courts
(section 5.3), and finally the conflict between autonomy and altruism, against
the background of the distinction between contract law and noncontractual
liability law (section 5.4).
Knowledge and responsibility
The present study shows the importance of human knowledge as the basis
of responsibility in the law of obligations (section 5.2.1). Generally speaking,
three levels of knowledge can be distinguished. First: subjective knowledge,
i.e. what individuals actually know or may be presumed to know. Second:
objectified knowledge, i.e. what individuals legally ought to know. Third: purely
objective knowledge, i.e. what is objectively known (section 5.2.2). The practical
relevance of this distinction lies in the field of judicial evidence. Since only
facts need to be proved, and no normative qualifications (juridica non sunt
probanda), the burden of proof only relates to the first and the third level of
knowledge. The second level rather asks for legal reasoning instead of factual
evidence (section 5.2.3).
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Objectivation – the process of constructing objectified knowledge of the
second level – means that the responsible party is judged on the knowledge
he ought to have, from a legal point of view. Objectivation requires a con-
textual reasoning, taking into account the circumstances of the case.However,
the court may not confine its judgement to an indiscriminate reference to the
individual circumstances. As far as possible, the court should make explicit
its selection of subjective and objective circumstances (section 5.2.4).
In general, two types of objectivation can be distinguished. First: person-
related objectivation, which means that the objectified knowledge is related not
to the responsible party himself, but to somebody else. Second: knowledge-related
objectivation, which means that the objectified knowledge is related not to the
actual knowledge of the responsible party, but to another kind of knowledge
(section 5.2.5). Knowledge-related objectivation can result in the application
of a duty to investigate, namely if the objectified knowledge is related to (sup-
posed) information which the responsible party does not know yet, but needs
to find out through further research. A special variant of the knowledge-related
objectivation is generalization, meaning that the objectified knowledge is related
to general notions rather than specific facts (section 5.2.6). Person-related
objectivation is, unlike knowledge-related objectivation, aimed at identifying
the knowledge other people could expect on the part of the responsible party.
Thus, person-related objectivation can be described as a form of imputation
of knowledge (section 5.2.6).
Imputation of knowledge of officials to companies and institutions is
governed by the so-called identification standard, as adopted in the Babbel
judgement of the Dutch Supreme Court. According to this standard, imputed
knowledge can be assumed if the official’s knowledge, pursuant to generally
accepted standards, counts as knowledge of the company or institution
involved. As appears from the Dutch Supreme Court decision in the case
Ontvanger/Voorsluijs, the identification standard may not be used for the
imputation of ‘external’ knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of people outside the
company or institution involved. Article 3:66 paragraph 2 DCC, referring to
the ‘doctrine of the greatest contribution’ in the field of representation, provides
a suitable standard for situations similar to representation. From a broader
perspective, the principle of reasonable reliance (protection of legitimate ex-
pectations) should be decisive as a comprehensive standard for the imputation
of knowledge (section 5.2.7).
Information duties
Information duties represent the connecting link between knowledge and
responsibility in the law of obligations (section 5.3.1). The power of information
duties as a judicial instrument lies in their flexibility (i.e. their contextual
nature) and manageability (i.e. their usability in different parts of the law).
Both powers have a downside. Flexibility bears the risk of unpredictable
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outcomes. Be that as it may, the specific context should never be overlooked
when applying information duties. There is no need to fear ‘Einzelfallgerechtig-
keit’, as long as the courts strike an adequate balance between standards and
facts. Manageability, the second power of information duties, bears the risk
of unbridled application. The Dutch professor Jan Vranken rightly pointed
out that information duties are able to swallow other doctrines of the law of
obligations. This ‘absorbing effect’ of information duties – the fact that they
cut straight across doctrinal divisions – is not always desirable. The primary
purpose of information duties is – and should remain – limited to the judge-
ment in individual cases (section 5.3.1).
When applying information duties, the starting point should be that in
principle people are responsible for their own well-informed behaviour.
Therefore the ignorant party who accuses the defendant of breaching an
information duty, is bound to provide the arguments which support this claim
(section 5.3.2).
The basic requirements and factors for the application of a precontractual
duty of disclosure under article 6:228 paragraph 1b DCC, in the field of error,
point towards a model for the application of any duty to provide information.
In short, precontractual duties of disclosure and noncontractual duties towarn
can be assumed provided that: (i) the responsible party knew or could reasonably
be expected to know the relevant information and its importance (section 5.3.3)
and furthermore (ii) the ignorant party could reasonably expect to be informed
on that matter (section 5.3.4), given the circumstances of the case, more speci-
fically the nature of the legal relationship between the parties, the nature of
the relevant information and the nature of the interests involved (section 5.3.5).
This model implies that the ignorant party can be charged with a duty to
investigate, especially if he had reasons to doubt the supposed state of affairs.
Guided by the reasonable expectations of both parties, themutual information
duties should be qualified as complementary duties, i.e. as mutual counter-
parts. This means that the responsibility of the ignorant party begins where
the responsibility of the other party ends, and vice versa. Such a ‘digital’
approach promotes the clarity of legal judgements (section 5.3.6).
The content of information duties – i.e. the degree to which they oblige
the responsible party to provide information – should be determined equally
in contract law and noncontractual liability law. The noncontractual standard
from the Jetblast case, referring to the likely effectiveness of the provision of
information, can be applied by way of analogy in contract law too (section
5.3.7).
According to article 150 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, the ignorant
party who accuses the defendant of breaching an information duty, bears the
burden of proof. If the ignorant party argues that he was not informed at all
by the defendant, the court deciding questions of fact could reverse the burden
of proof, or could require the defendant to indicate more specifically what
kind of information he (allegedly) provided to the ignorant party. The best
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way to actually prove the provision of information, is by letting the ignorant
party sign a written receipt (section 5.3.7).
Autonomy or altruism?
As a result of the application of information duties, ignorant parties enjoy a
high degree of protection in the law of obligations. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the protection of ignorant parties has been made to a rule. Historic-
ally and to this day, information duties are determined by the principle of
autonomy, since they aim to promote well-informed behaviour. Duties to
provide information can only be assumed, if the ignorant party, given the
circumstances of the case, could reasonably expect to be informed (section
5.4.1).
The rise of generally formulated duties of care (‘zorgplichten’) in the law
of obligations seems to be in contrast with the foregoing. Unlike the idea of
contextual protection, these duties of care aim at categorical ‘mass justice’.
Duties of care are said to represent a ‘basic standard’ of the law of obligations
or an ‘overarching principle’, which connects the different areas of the law.
The question arises if the same goes for information duties. In particular, it
is to be considered if there is room for a synthesis of information duties within
the law of obligations as a whole, i.e. if precontractual information duties and
noncontractual information duties can be treated equally (section 5.4.2).
At first sight, precontractual and noncontractual information duties differ
in terms of remedies. The different remedies for breach of information duties
are, however, not essential to their material content (section 5.4.3). Two other
apparent differences, relating to the (in)voluntariness of the legal relationship
involved (section 5.4.4) and the (non-)reciprocity of the interests involved
(section 5.4.5), can have no decisive consequences as to the content of informa-
tion duties either. In the end, the precontractual or noncontractual nature of
information duties should not play a role when applying them in individual
cases, unless it is combined with circumstances that influence the assessment
of what parties might reasonably expect from each other in terms of the
provision or gathering of information (section 5.4.5).
The question ariseswhat this synthesis of precontractual and noncontractual
information duties, as argued above, means for the doctrinal division between
contract law and noncontractual liability law. Legal doctrine assumes – and
accepts – that the boundaries between these two fields of the law are blurred
nowadays, resulting in a ‘fluent’ law of obligations. Still, it seems an overstate-
ment to say that information duties respresent a ‘basic standard’ or an ‘over-
arching principle’ of the law of obligations. Rather, I would consider informa-
tion duties as the contextual outcome of unwritten private law (section 5.4.6).
Although certain areas of the law of obligations, partly under the influence
of information duties, do develop into a kind of ‘duty-of-care law’, there is
in my opinion no reason to conclude that the traditional dichotomy of the law
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of obligations – the distinction between contract law and noncontractual
liability law – is outdated.
